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‘(S)extremism’: Imagining Violent Women in the Twenty-First Century with Navine G. 
Khan-Dossos and Julia Kristeva  
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The neologism ‘(s)extremism’ indicates a nexus of ideas intrinsic to the way in which 
contemporary culture imagines the figure of the violent woman. Firstly, it identifies 
the sexism visible in reactions to such women; secondly it highlights the fact that these 
misogynistic responses are often predicated precisely on sex, not (only) on gender (i.e. on 
assumptions about woman’s biological function); thirdly it highlights the question mark that 
hovers over the issue of what extremism is – especially when applied to women. To examine 
and theorize these ideas, the article moves beyond existing works in critical terrorism studies 
and looks to research-informed art installations by international artist Navine G. Khan-
Dossos, with whom the author has collaborated, and to the writings of Julia Kristeva who 
explores the link between female ‘extremism’ and ‘exceptionality’, and describes how 
feminism itself is constituted with regard to the socio-symbolic order as a form of terroristic 
violence.  
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‘(S)extremism’: Imagining Violent Women in the Twenty-First Century with Navine G. 
Khan-Dossos and Julia Kristeva  
 
LISA DOWNING 
 
Introduction1 
 
It must be pointed out […] that since the dawn of feminism, and certainly before, the political 
activity of exceptional women, and thus in a certain sense of liberated women, has taken the form 
of murder, conspiracy, and crime.  
(Julia Kristeva, ‘Le temps des femmes’ (1979) / ‘Women’s Time’ (1981)) 
 
This article considers the cultural concept of extremism and its connection with 
exceptionality, especially when applied to female subjects. Exceptionality here, as for Julia 
Kristeva who, in the epigraph above, links female terrorists to feminist pioneers, pertains to 
aberrant and violent individuals and to liberated, creative ones. Exceptional or extreme 
tendencies, characteristics, and qualities, when embodied in a woman, are understood 
markedly differently than the same qualities when embodied in a man. This has much to do 
with the ways in which the whole idea of ‘self’ is inherently coded as masculine, and male 
actions understood as rational by default.2 Female exceptionality and wilful female 
subjectivity therefore inevitably appear as a form of – at least symbolic – violence or 
extremism.  
In what follows, I turn specifically to the category of the ‘extremist woman’. I coin 
the term ‘(s)extremism’ to indicate the nexus of interconnected ideas intrinsic to the way in 
which contemporary culture imagines this figure. Within the category of what is deemed 
‘extremist woman’, we might find, firstly and most obviously, women who commit or 
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facilitate physical violence in the pursuit of a political or ideological agenda (female 
terrorists). Secondly, we might consider those with political affiliations that are associated 
with macho or anti-women projects – whether fundamentalist theocratic or far-Right – 
without committing physical violence. And thirdly, and conversely, as resonates with the 
quotation from Kristeva’s canonical essay with which I open, we might consider those who 
pursue feminist politics that are deemed excessive or extreme. The content of the feminist 
political belief deemed ‘extremist’ will vary historically according to the values, fashions, 
and ideologies of the epoch, but one can also make the argument that feminism by its nature, 
where it genuinely opposes the aims of a patriarchal status-quo rather than appeasing it, 
fulfils a symbolically violent function.  
 ‘(S)extremism’, as I am imagining it, and in its different manifestations, thus 
involves three interlinked concepts. Firstly, and crucially, it identifies a form of sexism in 
cultural responses to outlier women. Secondly, and relatedly, it draws attention to the fact 
that these misogynistic responses are often predicated precisely on understandings of sex, not 
only of gender (i.e. they are situated on the politically contested ground that is woman’s 
biology as well as on assumptions about femininity and the nature of a ‘proper’ woman). 
Thirdly, the term highlights the question mark that hovers over the issue of what extremism is 
– especially when applied to women. This article, then, explores the construction of the figure 
of the extremist woman in a contemporary culture that increasingly struggles to dissociate 
‘symbolic violence’ from ‘literal violence’ and that often mistakes the former for the latter.  
In the interests of clarity, and mindful of not claiming a term as my own without 
looking at prior uses of related terms, I note that ‘sextremism’, without my parentheses 
around the ‘s’, has been previously used by the Ukrainian activist group Femen to describe 
their overtly sexualized methods of protest (they often appear topless or in various stages of 
undress). Femen term themselves ‘sextremist feminists’. In this meaning of the term, the 
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‘sex’ obviously refers to the deployment of hyper-sexualization and ‘sex-positivism’ as a 
strategy of political resistance. In the title of an article from 2014, Emily Channell asks ‘is 
sextremism the new feminism?’, and writes of Femen and the Russian group Pussy Riot: 
‘both groups appropriate sexual language and imagery as well as physical sexuality in protest 
of their current regimes’.3 While a relevant phenomenon for this discussion, this meaning of 
‘sextremism’, where ‘sex’ equals strategic sexualization, is not the primary one I am focusing 
on. My concept here is of extremism with the sex of the perpetrator as a modifier of how that 
extremism is read. The term, then, presupposes sex in the sense of belonging to a sex class (to 
use what is often assumed to be an outmoded feminist concept as it is linked to the class 
analysis beloved of radical feminism, rather than to the gender identity politics of the current 
‘wave’) – and which leads directly to sexism. ‘(S)extremism’ as a term also deliberately 
signals the way in which the sexism inherent to perceptions of female extremism is often 
occluded, unconscious, or bracketed off. 
In what follows, to examine and theorize these ideas, I will look to research-informed 
art installations by international artist Navine G. Khan-Dossos, with whom I have recently 
collaborated on two relevant exhibitions, ‘Echo Chamber’ (2017) and ‘Shoot the Women 
First’ (2018). I will also engage further with the work of Kristeva. I revisit her classic essay 
‘Women’s Time’ (1979), which considers female terrorism as the result of women’s 
alienation from the socio-symbolic order. I also briefly consider her more recent published 
volume of interviews and essays This Incredible Need to Believe (2009), which constitutes a 
plea for a secular humanism based on the creative arts and humanities, and on an acceptance 
of female exceptionality (what we might call a feminist post-post-secular turn) in the face of 
a perceived crisis of extremism and in place of the ‘war on terror’.  
My decision to use artworks and feminist philosophy as the underpinning theoretical 
context of this article is in the service of demonstrating how artistic and theoretical praxis 
 5 
may be at least as pertinent for articulating ‘(s)extremism’ as more straightforward critical 
discourses, such as that embodied by existing works in critical terrorism studies (or CTS). 
CTS has emerged in recent years as a body of scholarship which distinguishes itself, 
according to Richard Jackson, by its ‘particular critical theory-influenced ontology […] its 
methodological pluralism […] and its scepticism towards official counterterrorism culture 
and practices’.4 Despite feminist and gender studies methods drawn from the social sciences 
being fairly prominent in CTS, Kristeva’s writings and those of other French feminists have 
not so far been taken up by writers in this discipline, and considerations of artistic praxis as a 
political and intellectual intervention are also absent. The reflections in this article thereby 
constitute an original contribution to this broader field.  
 
Canonical Studies of Female Extremists 
 
Before moving on to the original theorization in this article, as indicated above, it is 
necessary to acknowledge and briefly discuss the key works in the body of extant literature 
on female extremists and female terrorists. The earliest of these, journalist Eileen 
MacDonald’s book Shoot the Women First (1991), takes its title from the direction reputedly 
given in the 1980s to members of West Germany’s anti-terrorist squad. It subsequently 
became standard advice offered by Interpol to other European agencies in the wake of attacks 
carried out by the Baader-Meinhof group, the Red Brigade, the IRA, and other paramilitary 
groups that included female terrorists. The advice that the armed response unit should kill 
female terrorists first, as they will not hesitate to shoot and are more impulsive than male 
terrorists, follows the familiar line borrowed from Rudyard Kipling that ‘the female is more 
deadly than the male’, which MacDonald uses as the epigraph of her book.  
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MacDonald attempts to account for the instruction by extrapolating that the especially 
violent zeal of the female terrorists whom she interviews, including Ulrike Meinhoff, the 
Palestinian fighter Leila Khaled, and the Female Basque Separatist agents of ETA, issues 
universally from a displaced maternal feeling: the political or nationalist cause stands in for 
the child that the woman would properly be protecting. She writes: 
 
It was as if the women were capable of projecting maternal instincts onto the 
cause. A mother will turn killer to protect her young and if such a projection of 
maternal instincts is possible, it may go some way to explaining why many of the 
women seemed to be so much more dedicated, single-minded and determined 
than their male comrades.5   
 
The observed likelihood of female terrorists reacting more violently than their male 
counterparts and resorting to violent action earlier in a confrontation is only comprehensible, 
it seems, in the context of a cultural consensus on women’s ‘natural instinct’. And to return to 
Kipling, we see that the line that has become something of a cliché refers to both literal 
animals and to maternal (animal) instinct: 
 
When the Himalayan peasant meets the he-bear in his pride,  
He shouts to scare the monster, who will often turn aside.  
But the she-bear thus accosted rends the peasant tooth and nail 
For the female of the species is more deadly than the male.6  
 
 MacDonald’s logic and the assertions in her book would largely set the tone for 
understandings of extremist women for more than a decade. In their game-changing critical 
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study of violent women and of the discourses surrounding them, Mothers, Monsters, Whores 
(2007), Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry take issue with the logic that MacDonald 
propounded. They write: 
 
Women engaged in proscribed violence are often portrayed either as ‘mothers’, 
women who are fulfilling their biological destinies; as ‘monsters’, women who 
are pathologically damaged and are therefore drawn to violence [….]; or as 
‘whores’, women whose violence is inspired by sexual dependence and 
depravity.7 
 
What they point out here is effectively that women’s motivations are repeatedly reduced to 
biological determinism gone awry (maternal instinct or erotic instinct, both diverted into 
violence) or to pathology (violent women are monstrous or mad in transgressing the pacifistic 
life-giving nature that is assumed to be proper to women). In the latter vein, they write that 
‘[v]iolent women are not women at all, but singular mistakes and freak accidents’,8 evoking 
what I have called elsewhere, examples of ‘identity category violation’.9 What they also 
uncover is a tendency in scholarship, as in media and popular discourse, to downplay any 
distinction between women’s actions as rational, chosen, pragmatic, and logical in favour of 
appeals to their bodily (or animal) nature. Female reason is, in fact, consistently denied – a 
female terrorist’s commitment to her cause is always understood in instinctual, rather than 
rational, terms. Sjoberg and Gentry write: ‘Very few researchers actually depict violent 
women as rational actors’.10 
The belief that female terrorists are deadlier than their male counterparts, then, issues 
from the longstanding masculinist cultural conviction that ‘maternal instinct’ (perverted here 
into a political cause) is a strange and overwhelmingly powerful urge. But if women are 
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indeed more zealous than men when taking violent political action, it may be because so 
great is the transgression committed when one born into the ‘sex class’ is driven by a political 
agenda (something assumed proper only to men) that her violence will be single-minded and 
terrible. This is because it stands as the achievement of pure will over the – powerfully 
effective and affective – myth of maternal, passive, care-giving, and altruistic female nature. 
 
Imagining (S)extremism with Navine G. Khan-Dossos (1): ‘Echo Chamber’ (2017) 
 
If rationality is denied in cultural narratives about extremist women in favour of a focus on 
instinct, as pointed out by Sjoberg and Gentry, what is also denied is any meaningful focus 
on the interiority, reflectiveness, imagination, individuality, or subjectivity of such women, 
since the female body and the appearance of the ‘(s)extremist’ subject are so often over-
emphasized – and sometimes fetishized. In The Subject of Murder (2013) I explored how 
photographs, court drawings, and mug shots are among key currencies produced, over-
exposed and exchanged to gain a literal – but overdetermined – ‘picture’ of murderous 
women. The perfect example of this is the police photograph of Myra Hindley, the child-
killer dubbed ‘The Most Evil Woman in Britain’, that has so often been reproduced in print 
media and, in recent decades, shared on the internet. It has taken on an iconic status and, in 
1995, became the basis for Marcus Harvey’s controversial artwork ‘Myra’, which used casts 
of children’s handprints to reproduce the killer’s mugshot. At her trial in 1965, commentators 
and journalists insisted that Hindley’s evil nature could be read on her face, with one, Pamela 
Hansford Johnson, writing that Hindley’s accomplice, Ian Brady, ‘looks ordinary’ while 
‘Myra Hindley does not’,11 and focusing on ‘the Medusa face of Hindley, under the melon 
puffball of hair’.12 The violent woman is visually read, via an insistent, penetrating gaze, as 
unnatural and her appearance is called upon both to reveal and to confirm her nature.  
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The British-born, Athens-based artist Navine G. Khan-Dossos read The Subject of 
Murder while planning an exhibition, ‘Echo Chamber’. She contacted me in early 2017 to 
invite me to take part in a conversation on the subject of women, representation, and 
violence, to accompany the work. ‘Echo Chamber’ explores the phenomenon surrounding 
Samantha Lewthwaite, known in the press as the ‘White Widow’, a white British convert to 
Islam from Aylesbury, born in 1983, who would become the widow of Germaine Lindsey, 
one of the men responsible for the 7/7 bombing in London in 2005. Lewthwaite disappeared 
from Britain and has since entered extremist folklore as the reputed inspiration for, or 
organizer of, a number of international terror attacks, including the bombing of a football 
match in Mombasa in 2012 and the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi in 2013. She is 
often described as the symbolic ‘mother’ of all Jihadists and has, in fact, given birth to a 
number of children with a series of Jihadi husbands. She serves as an iconic muse for Al-
Shabaab.  
Lewthwaite’s selfies have appeared in the international press and virally on the 
internet, making her a prime example of a violent woman whose image has been overshared 
– or overexposed – as an attempt, perhaps, to compensate for the little that is factually known 
about her life, motivations, and current movements. Early photographs show the smiling 
schoolgirl in secular dress while, in later selfies, she is veiled with only her expressive eyes 
visible. The effect of this multiple over-exposure of Lewthwaite’s face is to reduce her entire 
being to image – to a Western, and then to a starkly differentiated Islamic, femininity, 
underscoring how a focus on the physicality of femaleness characterizes culture’s response to 
violent women.  
While Lewthwaite is clearly an exceptional subject – the consummate ‘(s)extremist’ – 
documentary filmmaker Adam Wishart sought in the film he made about her in 2014, The 
White Widow: Searching for Samantha, to restore to perceptions of this extraordinary 
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individual a sense of her very ordinariness. Discussing the film in an interview with Zoe 
Williams for The Guardian, he stated:  
 
I’m always struck by how banal it all is. All that narrative of terrorism is about 
hate preachers who brainwashed X. I think it’s much simpler than that. She is in 
this extreme place now. If you follow every step she took, they almost all make 
sense. If I think about my own life, if I had altered the trajectory of each decision 
I’d made over 20 years, then I too would be in a very different place. The one 
step she made that doesn’t make sense was when she began to believe that 
violence is the right course.13  
 
Violence here is seen almost as a mere misstep or mishap, rather than as a rational decision or 
the result of political conviction. The ‘banality of evil’ having become something of a cliché 
in discussions of political violence in the wake of Hannah Arendt’s classic work, it can easily 
be used to erase the possibility of agentic wilfulness, especially, I would argue, in the case of 
women. Discourses about Lewthwaite’s case draw repeatedly on the paradoxical pair of 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘ordinary’. Describing Lewthwaite’s self-presentation in selfies leaked to 
the press and found in objects from her raided dwellings, Zoe Williams writes that 
Lewthwaite ‘wears her radicalisation (sic) so proudly, but it sits strange and ersatz upon her, 
like she bought it in Claire’s Accessories’.14 Wishart’s and Williams’s rhetorical gestures 
here simultaneously humanize Lewthwaite and diminish her.  
Khan-Dossos’s ‘Echo Chamber’, which was installed in Het Oog (The Eye), at the 
Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and ran from May-November 2017, is an 
aniconic portrait. As such, it constitutes a gesture of resistance to the incessant focus on 
Lewthwaite’s physicality and to the media attention designed to turn her into a mythic, 
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maternal martyr figure. But it also rejects the banalization that is the standard leftist, counter-
strategy to othering and mythologizing discourses of the extremist, and it allows the 
possibility of Lewthwaite, qua agentic individual, to emerge. Khan-Dossos, in short, dares to 
think about, and attempts to convey, a sense of Lewthwaite’s subjectivity in place of 
representing her corporeal form or her deeds. The artist made a conscious decision that no 
photograph or drawn portrait of Lewthwaite would appear in the gallery space or in any of 
the printed material that accompanied the exhibition. ‘Echo Chamber’, for Khan-Dossos, has 
the aim of representing an ‘unknown inner landscape … as a way to counter and question the 
common representations of women and violence’.15  
 
(Fig. 1. ‘Echo Chamber’. Copyright: Navine G. Khan-Dossos / The Van Abbemuseum) 
 
Khan-Dossos’s artistic training includes a specialism in Islamic art that she deployed 
in the painted work. Taking up the whole of the curved wall behind glass that is ‘The Eye’, 
‘Echo Chamber’ comprises a repetitive pattern of muqarnas, an Islamic architectural form, 
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while along the bottom of the painting Khan-Dossos depicted a forensic ruler. 
Representational and cultural registers are juxtaposed, such that intimations of meditation, 
devotion, and aesthetic tradition sit alongside the iconography of securitization, 
counterterrorism, and crime. The artist also employed a limited colour palette to create a 
visual ‘symbolic language’.16 Red, pink, white, grey, and black juxtapose and represent – 
respectively – danger and ‘high alert’, stereotypical femininity, purity, the ‘grey zone’, and 
ultimately the colour of death as well as ‘the political colour of choice for many extremist 
movements’.17 ‘Echo Chamber’, then, is a study – simultaneously and paradoxically – in 
demystification and unknowability. It focuses on the not-easily-apprehended. We cannot 
know what Lewthwaite is doing now or where she is – but nor should we assume that we can 
categorize or entirely comprehend her on the basis of what she has let us see and what has 
been reproduced of her in the form of straightforward figuration.  
 
Imagining (S)extremism with Navine G. Khan-Dossos (2): ‘Shoot the Women First’ 
(2018) 
 
This exhibition, which debuted at the Breeder Gallery in Athens, Greece, in March 2018, 
takes as its name the title of the first published study of female terrorists, MacDonald’s Shoot 
the Women First, discussed above. The exhibition is designed to resemble a shooting gallery; 
visitors work their way through a number of rooms hung with a series of painted gesso panels 
featuring various symbols, including those resembling discretionary command training 
targets, on backgrounds of pink and grey. The symbols on the targets become more 
recognizably humanoid as the visitor progresses through the space. To accompany Khan-
Dossos’s visual interactive experience, I wrote a text that was placed online and distributed in 
a printed form to gallery attendees, and a choreographed performance was created by 
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Yasmina Reggad, in which performers wore cardboard simulacra of the painted targets. Thus, 
this exhibition was a multimedia, collaborative, co-created effort, in which all of the parts 
that make up the exhibition are united by a concern with the meaning of the term ‘target’ and 
the ways in which women are made to fill this role. 
 
(Fig 2. ‘Shoot the Women First’. Copyright: Navine G. Khan-Dossos / The Breeder Gallery)  
 
The exhibition was site-specific insofar as the Breeder Gallery is located in Athens’s 
Red-Light District. One of Khan-Dossos’s influences in deciding to think about women as 
targets was an incident from 2012, in which female drug-users suspected of doing casual sex 
work in Athens were rounded up by the police and submitted to forced HIV testing. Those 
found to have a positive test result were prosecuted for grievous bodily harm by means of 
transmitting the virus and were imprisoned.  The suspects’ personal information was released 
by the police to the media, leading to further stigmatization of female sex workers and 
women living with HIV. The ‘sex’ of ‘(s)extremism’ is evoked here in the elision between 
violence and sex, a sexual woman and a violent woman, the targeted and the target. 
In Khan-Dossos’s words ‘the paintings in this exhibition reflect on the role of women 
regarded by society as both perpetrators and victims of violence, questioning what it means to 
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be both a menace and a target’.18 In my text to accompany the show, I reflected on precisely 
this double-edged and bidirectional sword that women outliers both wield and are assailed 
by. When a female extremist targets an institution (be it Western secular liberal democracy or 
the patriarchy) is it pertinent to bear in mind that she may well act from the conviction that 
her identity or interests have already been targeted and violated by the hegemonic order. In 
articulating the injury against her carried out by the powers that be, the (s)extremist woman 
herself becomes once again the target of opprobrium, censure, and othering.  
In the discretionary command training that the exhibition evokes, shooters are told to 
listen to commands and shoot the shapes and colours in a given order. The ambiguity as to 
who is responsible for the violence in such an exercise – the shooter or the one giving the 
orders – echoes the workings of a misogynistic culture in which violence done to women who 
stick their heads above the parapet originates from multiple locations and is self-justificatory. 
There is a certain automation to cultural misogyny, as it repeats the age-old punishment of 
outlier women – witches, midwifes, scolds – those perceived as extremist owing to the threat 
they pose to the order that seeks to control and define them.  
My aim in articulating the function of ‘the target’ was, at least in part, to expose the 
material nature of the ‘extra danger’ that the instruction ‘Shoot the women first’ describes 
and to lay bare the logic underpinning it. When a woman asserts her agency and breaks free 
from her sex’s age-old role as victim, she challenges the authority of that system and throws 
the legitimacy of its rules into question. To conclude my essay, I wrote: 
 
[T]he violent woman is perceived as more violent simply by dint of the 
exceptional effort of violating so completely the category to which she has been 
coercively assigned. It is thus that the woman becomes the first and most urgent 
target for annihilation: she refused to be what she was told she was’.19 
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Reading feminist extremism via Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ 
 
If the exhibitions discussed above were visual attempts to acknowledge without 
straightforwardly representing the condition of outlier women, and to gesture towards the 
multiple institutional terms in which extremist female subjectivity is framed without 
legitimizing those terms or those institutions, then Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ can be seen to 
do something similar in textual form with regard to women’s relationship to what she calls 
the ‘socio-symbolic order’. The essay is an ambitious and imaginative attempt to understand 
the historical locatedness of female subjectivity and feminist movements via an exploration 
of the ways in which women have been excluded from what Kristeva calls ‘the time of 
history’. The essay discusses both political or terrorist violence and feminist projects as 
attempts by women to deal with the symbolic exclusion they face. In particular, in some quite 
striking ways, the logic of Kristeva’s argument parallels in discursive form the attempts made 
visually and textually in Khan-Dossos’s ‘Shoot the Women First’ to articulate how targeting 
works in the context of women’s (perceived or actual) violence.  
Kristeva describes ‘two generations’ of feminism’,20  which is her way of talking 
about what are often termed the first and second waves of feminism, but which she insists 
must be understood as feminist modalities or positions rather than just as sequential historical 
trends. She argues that the ‘first generation’ sought to ‘gain a place in linear time’ via rights-
based gains – a feminism ‘deeply rooted in the socio-political life of nations’.21 Such aims are 
seen to follow a logic of identification with ‘the logical and ontological values of a rationality 
dominant in the nation state’.22 This is her way of understanding the liberal, first-wave 
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feminism of the early twentieth century, associated with the suffragettes and their ilk who 
sought to achieve parity of rights with men in the civic sphere (women as selves and equals). 
Her definition of the second generation is of the post-1968 group of women who 
would form what has also been called the second wave.23 Describing what has commonly 
become known as ‘difference feminism’, she writes of the post-structural refusal of ‘the 
universal’ characterized by this generation and applied to the condition of women, and the 
rejection of any desire for women’s incorporation into the time of history. Rather, she argues 
that ‘[t]hese women seek to give a language to the intersubjective and corporeal experiences 
left mute by culture in the past’ and that ‘this feminism situates itself outside the linear time 
of identities’.24 
Kristeva argues that the egalitarian, rights-based aims of first-wave feminism were 
largely met under systems such as Eastern European communism which had a surfeit of 
women doctors and leaders. However, she argues that this brought no symbolic recognition 
of the difference of female subjectivity; indeed sexual difference remained occluded under 
both capitalist and communist societies. This raises two questions with regard to women and 
power. Firstly, Kristeva asks: ‘What happens when women come into power and identify 
with it?’, and secondly: ‘What happens when, on the contrary, they refuse power and create a 
parallel society, a counter-power which then takes on aspects ranging from a club of ideas to 
a group of terrorist commandos?’25 The answer she offers is that, in fact, these ‘parallel 
societies’ or counter societies inevitably end up imitating the structure they set out to resist. 
She states that having more women in power has not changed the shape or form of hierarchy 
and that women have identified with and repeated the most totalitarian of power structures. 
Inevitably, perhaps, she uses the Nazis as her example. Kristeva seems to argue here that 
women’s response to structural misogyny, and to a violent culture, is to turn the socio-
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symbolic violence they experience against themselves back against that society (the targeted 
becoming the target): 
 
But when a subject is too brutally excluded from this sociosymbolic stratum; 
when, for example, a woman feels her affective life as a woman or her condition 
as a social being too brutally ignored by existing discourse or power […] she 
may, by counterinvesting the violence she has endured, make of herself a 
‘possessed’ agent of this violence in order to combat what was experienced as 
frustration – with arms which may seem disproportional, but which are not so in 
comparison with the subjective or more precisely narcissistic suffering from 
which they originate.26 
 
So, to concretize, whereas a far-Right-wing female activist over-identifies with the existing 
ideological power and seeks to extend it (let us say, for example, Marine Le Pen), the radical 
Islamic woman (personified, perhaps, by Samantha Lewthwaite) rejects Western democratic 
secularism and identifies with another form of fundamentalism. And, distinctly but 
analogously, radical feminists produce what Kristeva calls a counter-society on the basis of a 
sex-based exclusivity that she thinks ends up being nothing more than a kind of ‘inverted 
sexism’.27 Protest movements such as feminism are thus seen inherently to imitate the 
structure of the society they reject or oppose. Kristeva writes: ‘the very logic of counterpower 
and of countersociety necessarily generates, by its very structure, its essence as a simulacrum 
of the combated society or of power’.28 
Kristeva’s analysis of female violence in Women’s Time allows us to understand 
(s)extremism as a rational – that is justified and appropriate – response to a stultifying 
situation of symbolic and literal violence and cultural sexism, yet one which inevitably apes 
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aspects of what it opposes. In analyzing both the case of Samantha Lewthwaite for ‘Echo 
Chamber’ and the mechanism of targeting for ‘Shoot the Women First’ in collaboration with 
Khan-Dossos, it became crucial to restore to extremist women their status of ‘rational agent’ 
that Sjoberg and Gentry point out is repeatedly denied them. Female extremism, as 
understood in Kristevan terms, is a rational response to a violent patriarchal order. 
Yet, however rational a response it may be, Kristeva argues that female extremism 
often fails the women who strategically employ it. She implicitly appears to argue that all 
collectivist movements are inevitably prone to becoming rotten with power and makes a 
surprising gesture towards individuality as a way out of the impasse when she hopes that 
‘having started with the idea of difference, feminism will be able to break free of its belief in 
Woman, Her power, Her writing’.29 Here she suggests that feminism should free itself of a 
totalizing and collectivizing notion of ‘Woman’, in upper-case letters – a cipher, a false idol 
belonging to the past and redolent of the patriarchal order’s definition of what she is. The aim 
instead would be ‘to bring out the singularity of each woman, and beyond this her 
multiplicities, her plural languages, beyond the horizon, beyond sight, beyond faith itself’.30  
 
Conclusion: (S)exceptionality as an Antidote to (S)extremism?  
 
To conclude, I will continue my dialogue with Kristeva, but move closer to the present by 
engaging with her interview with Carmine Donzelli, originally published in Italian and 
subsequently translated into English in the volume entitled This Incredible Need to Believe. 
In the interview, Kristeva addresses the enduring problem that she perceives to exist of ‘a 
prepolitical and prereligious need to believe’.31 She links the simultaneous and paradoxical 
rise of secularism to the perceived increase in extremist ideology, while also arguing that 
‘[c]ontrary to what some would have us believe, the clash of religions is but a surface 
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phenomenon’.32 In place of a reassertion of religion qua moral code or safeguard against 
violence (as it has so obviously failed in the latter regard), Kristeva advocates something that 
resembles a secular ethics of awe that is intimately linked to the feminist struggles she 
sketched out 30 years earlier in ‘Women’s Time’ and the difficulty – and necessity – of 
seeing woman in the singular. 
She writes: 
 
Might this partaking, of each one of us, in the genius of the ‘great men and 
women’ rehabilitate, in our present culture, the self-surpassing that both antiquity 
and the Jewish and Christian religions or, in yet another way, the ‘genius’ of the 
‘great men’, encouraged? The twentieth century was forced to admit, under the 
pressure of various kinds of feminism, the existence of feminine genius, once all 
too easily reduced to maternal devotion and manual work.33  
 
Here, Kristeva makes the striking argument that the artistic creation produced by the ‘genius’ 
– and the genius of exceptional women in particular – might address multiple structural 
aporia. A first would be the gap left by the waning of faith (or better the absence of meaning) 
in which violence foments. A second would be the absence of a role for creative individual 
agency in the structures that oppositional collectives repeat, even as they seek to dismantle 
them, as argued in ‘Women’s Time’. In this context, Kristeva recalls her three-volume work 
Feminine Genius (Le Génie féminin), written between 2001 and 2004, with volumes on 
Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, and Colette, as announcing the possibility of ‘another era 
opening up’ that is ‘over and beyond the war of the sexes that has marked the twentieth 
century’.34 She writes: ‘Women, traditionally relegated to reproductive tasks but having 
acceded to subjective excellence in every domain, highlight the special meaning I give to the 
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idea of genius’.35 Ann Jefferson, in a discussion of Kristeva’s original contribution to the 
concept of ‘genius’, defines it as both recognizing exceptionality and inspiring or inviting the 
coming-into-being of a previously unsung (female)subject position.36 
I have used the term ‘(s)extremism’ in this article to suggest a paradox, a difficulty, 
for the cultural imagination concerning women who take up political positions that are 
counter to sex role stereotypes, or – at the limit – who commit politically motivated violence. 
By way of tentative conclusion, I am arguing, with Kristeva, that the cultural antidote to the 
‘problem’ of violent women is an acknowledgement of women’s individuality, capacity for 
greatness, ability to exist as selves rather than just as representatives of a group. This is 
because the difficulty of conceiving women as violent agents issues from the very same 
cultural biases as the difficulty of conceiving women as geniuses. Men, as the default subject 
(as transcendental rather than immanent, in Simone de Beauvoir’s language), are assumed to 
possess both the capacity to destroy and the capacity to create or produce; women have 
historically only been acknowledged for their capacity to reproduce, hence the hackneyed, 
cod-psychology explanation for female terrorism found in so many accounts, and exemplified 
especially by MacDonald. This does not mean that I think, as Kristeva seems to, that recourse 
to the arts and a celebration of female genius alone can save us from either structural 
misogyny or from the violence of terroristic projects. Rather, the symbolic violence done to 
women every day when they are assumed to be of a collective mind and for a (bodily) 
function, rather than singular rational selves could be alleviated by a re-evaluation of female 
selfhood as a legitimate phenomenon. In sum, to the problem of (s)extremism, adapting 
Kristeva, I advocate the coming into being of at least an acceptance, at best a celebration, of 
female individual achievement – dare I even say of (s)exceptionality? 
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